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On the Categorical Approach to
Free Speech – And the Protracted
Failure to Delimit the True
Threats Exception to the First
Amendment
Dr. Wayne Batchis
Introduction
On June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Elonis v.
United States on statutory rather than constitutional grounds.1
In doing so, it turned away an important opportunity to provide
needed clarification of true threats, a category of expression
relegated to a lower level of protection by the Court almost a
half-century ago.2 The categorical approach to free speech
made its first explicit appearance in Supreme Court case law in
1942.3 Since that time, the Court has relied heavily on this
method of constitutional interpretation, carving out discrete
exceptions from the seemingly absolutist mandate of the First
Amendment that Congress make no law abridging the freedom
of speech.4 Although the categorical approach – frequently
front and center in First Amendment adjudication – has been
with us for almost seventy-five years, it rests on a surprisingly
unsettled theoretical foundation.
It is an indispensable
doctrinal tool with a puzzling and sometimes contradictory
array of justifications and operating instructions. In this piece,
I attempt to clear up the confusion. I examine the evolution of
*
Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Delaware, 459 Smith Hall Newark, DE 19716-2574.
batchisw@udel.edu. Work: (302)831-1934. Cell: (215)410-1173.
1. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
2. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
3. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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this approach to the First Amendment. I critically assess the
famous dictum from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that is
responsible for establishing this system of classification. I
scrutinize a number of possible interpretations of Chaplinsky
and explore the disparate scholarly and judicial perspectives on
this mode of constitutional interpretation. Finally, I move from
the foundations and justifications of the categorical approach to
the way this system works in practice. I argue that if the
Court is to maintain its fidelity to an effectual categorical
system of First Amendment adjudication – one that is properly
respectful of the high stakes for free expression and democratic
self-governance – it is vitally important that Court adequately
define and operationalize respective categories. The final third
of this article delves into one such category: true threats. I
closely examine the Court’s true threats jurisprudence and look
critically at the recent Elonis decision, contrasting the Court’s
protracted failure to define and delimit true threats with the
comparatively robust guidance it has offered with other
discrete categories.
Content-based discrimination has long been understood as
one of the most troublesome forms of speech suppression.
Unlike mere restrictions on how or where views may be
expressed, targeting particular ideas because of their substance
and penalizing or prohibiting them evokes draconian images of
political oppression by tyrants, Orwellian mind control, and
raw censorship. Yet, although the First Amendment is written
in absolutist language, it has never been understood to offer
absolute protection. There has, quite simply, always been a
wide array of expression – from fraud to slander, from child
pornography to coercive threats – that overwhelming
majorities feel is intolerable and inconsistent with an ordered
civil society. The Supreme Court has settled upon a range of
doctrinal approaches to free speech that seek to both
accommodate this reality, yet pay proper heed to a
fundamental constitutional right.
One dominant methodology, utilized in most cases where
expression is regulated based upon its content, is referred to as
the categorical approach. In some respects, it would seem to
offer the best of all worlds: it allows for a default rule that –
consistent with the unequivocal language of the First
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Amendment itself – affords virtually absolute protection
against content based suppression, yet at the same time
permits discrete exceptions to be carved out when the
abridgement applies to certain narrow types of ostensibly “low
value” or especially harmful speech.5 While the categorical
approach certainly has its critics, many free speech advocates
applaud this method because it seems to minimize the risk of
ad hoc balancing, a case-by-case approach that makes all
speech susceptible to suppression if, in toto, a judge happens to
determine that the circumstances weigh on the speechrestrictive side of the scale.6
A categorical approach, however, is only as good as the
categories that comprise it. Indeed, a categorical system with
insufficiently defined categories may ultimately backfire. It
may be less protective than a wholesale balancing system. At
the same time, it may provide the misleading appearance of a
Court willing to place constraints on its own authority in the
interest of principled First Amendment jurisprudence. On its
face, a categorical structure establishes a consistent rule-based
methodology that constrains courts, promoting – if not
ensuring – disciplined predictability in free speech
jurisprudence; but when the Supreme Court holds tight to its
most important card – the definition and doctrinal mechanics
of the category itself – it does the very opposite. It invites
courts and legislatures to construe an entire category of
expression as broadly or idiosyncratically as it likes. Until a
higher court intervenes (or in the case of legislatures, any court
with jurisdiction), the default is a far-reaching and malleable
lack of First Amendment protection. Today, with the rapidly
expanding landscape of electronic idea conveyance, quelling
free speech uncertainty and insecurity is arguably more vitally
important than ever. Yet, in the 2015 decision of Elonis v.
United States, a Court notable for its highly speech-protective
jurisprudence willfully rejected one of its most high-profile and
potentially impactful opportunities to do just this.7 Even more
troubling, it did so with regard to a highly consequential
5. GEOFFREY R. STONE et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1134 (7th ed. 2013).
6. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 54-55 (1966).
7. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
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category of speech – true threats – a category in which it has
offered virtually no guidance since it was first formally
identified by the Court almost half a century ago.
Why not Absolutism?
The most obvious answer to the question “why not
absolutism?” is that expression is ubiquitous. Words can
defraud, extort, coerce, destroy reputations, and threaten lives.
An absolutist view of the First Amendment, in light of the
ubiquity of speech in human life, would inject what is quite
simply an unacceptable degree of lawlessness into the social
world. It would mean the end of contract law, for there could
be no adverse legal repercussions for not adhering to
contractual terms spoken or written. The words: “your money
or your life” would be protected speech. A Neo-Nazi leader
could command a follower to “pull the trigger” of a gun pressed
firmly against the cheek of an African American – and suffer
no consequences. An angry colleague could, without any fear of
adverse legal consequence, fabricate accusations of pedophilia
and proceed to destroy the career of his targeted victim by
spreading word of these falsely manufactured proclivities.
In short, it is virtually impossible to envision a regime of
truly absolute free speech. There are many examples, like the
hypotheticals above, all of which arguably turn on common
sense – circumstances in which most would agree that a First
Amendment exception is called for. Of course, these are the
easy cases. This leads us to two further complications. First,
not all cases are this easy. One person’s common sense
exception might be another’s outrageous incursion into
individual freedom. Second, whether addressing a purportedly
“easy” case or a more “difficult” one, how are courts to manage
this dilemma? Courts are confronted with what seems to be an
unenviable requirement that they selectively diverge from a
straight-forward reading of constitutional language. How is
this to be done?
One’s first impulse might be to suggest that courts treat
freedom of speech like any other public policy goal. On one
hand, we value free speech; on the other, we value other social
goods such as enforceable contracts, public safety, and
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compensation for those wrongfully harmed. Confronted with
circumstances in which free speech conflicts with another
important social value, a court could simply balance the
interests at stake and arrive at the outcome that best fits the
unique set of facts, circumstances, and interests of the case at
hand. This is the job of courts after all: to make judgments.
Yet, something about this approach might not sit well.
Courts would be tasked with a role virtually indistinguishable
from that of their legislative peers: simply weighing the policy
interests at stake and choosing the more “socially good” or least
“socially harmful” option. Courts would, in this respect, behave
just like legislators, drawing upon their personal philosophy,
accumulated wisdom, and evidence presented, to arrive at a
policy conclusion they think optimal: uninhibited free
expression on one side of the scale and counter-veiling interests
on the other. Such an approach might be said to blur the
important distinction between the legislative and judicial
roles.8 The great First Amendment scholar and consummate
critic of ad hoc balancing, Thomas Emerson, lamented that as a
doctrinal test, ad hoc balancing “frames the issues in such a
broad and undefined way, [and] is in effect so unstructured,
that it can hardly be described as a rule of law at all.”9 Even
more damning, to Emerson, ad hoc balancing “gives no real
meaning to the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . [I]t amounts to no
more than a statement that the legislature may restrict
expression whenever it finds it reasonable to do so, and that
the courts will not restrain the legislature unless that
judgment is itself unreasonable.”10
Furthermore, such balancing might suggest that all policy
interests – including those rooted in the Constitution – are on
the same plane, but they are not. Article VI of the Constitution
declares that the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.”11 More than two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall
scoffed at the notion that ordinary legislation and the
Constitution should be treated as equals, emphatically
describing as “a proposition too plain to be contested, that the
8. EMERSON, supra note 6, at 55.
9. Id. at 54.
10. Id. at 55.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it.”12 To
Justice Chief Marshall, the implications of adopting an
alternative construction would be dire and dispiriting: “then
written constitutions [would be no more than] absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature
illimitable.”13 What was intended by the framers to be a rigid
constraint on government power – circumscribing its role by
identifying particular values that were not to be breached –
would instead become just one more policy consideration to be
thrown into the mix by both the legislature and judiciary alike.
The very fact that the framers chose to include free speech as a
fundamental guarantee in the Constitution arguably precludes
this approach. The balance has already been stricken. As
Justice Black has observed, “a governmental policy of
unfettered communication of ideas does entail dangers. To the
Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived from
free expression were worth the risk. They embodied this
philosophy in the First Amendment’s command . . . .”14
A proponent of balancing might retort that balancing need
not suggest that all interests be accorded equal weight. A
preponderance of the evidence in favor of curtailing free speech
– need not be sufficient. In other words, one way to ensure that
constitutional provisions like the First Amendment are not
reduced to the status of ordinary law – merely by virtue of
accepting that they cannot be understood to be “absolute” – is
to set the bar for overriding that constitutional interest very
high. A range of balancing tests are commonly employed
throughout constitutional law, whether or not the Court
characterizes its analysis as such. Its approach has not been
monolithic. The Court has utilized a variety of standards
establishing the requisite interest needed to override a
constitutional right. It was the assumption that an easy-topass rationality standard would guide ad hoc balancing – with
the natural corollary of a deferential judiciary gladly willing to
accept a legislative determination that free speech may be
abridged – that motivated much of Emerson’s ire against this

12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
13. Id.
14. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951).
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doctrinal approach.15 However, other balancing standards
might require much more: a “compelling interest” may be
demanded to outweigh free speech.16 Other circumstances may
call for an intermediate analysis, where an “important
objective” is required – more than a merely rational interest,
but less than a compelling one.17
This framework is, of course, familiar to anyone with a
rudimentary understanding of Constitutional Law, and is
perhaps most commonly associated with the Court’s Equal
Protection jurisprudence. These tiers of review are also no
stranger to the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. In
some First Amendment settings, the Supreme Court has
adopted this mode of analysis, and one might conclude that this
is our answer to our dilemma. To accommodate the problem of
a First Amendment that simply cannot be absolute – as the
most ardent free speech advocate may, in theory, wish it could
be – we handicap one side of the scale, and we ratchet-up what
it required to outweigh free expression.
The Early Years
We might, in fact, characterize the first fifty years of
significant First Amendment jurisprudence by the Supreme
Court, beginning in the early part of the 20th century, as a
progression of this sort of balance-centric thinking. The
earliest First Amendment cases utilized the language of
balancing. Although in 1919 Justice Holmes introduced what
might, on-its-face, have looked like a black-or-white
dichotomous rule (the “clear and present danger” test), a
cursory read of Schenck v. United States reveals a methodology
that is much more sliding-scale than on-off switch.18 A clear
and present danger allowing for speech suppression was not to
15. EMERSON, supra note 6, at 55.
16. See Brown v. Entm't Merc. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)
(“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it
is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—
that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”)
17. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551-2556 (2012)
(Breyer, S., concurring).
18. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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be established by a crystal clear rule that could be applied with
uniformity, predictability, and certainty in any setting.
Rather, in Justice Holmes’ own words, determining whether
the standard has been met was “a question of proximity and
degree.”19 It is, in short, a balance.
Justice Holmes explained that the First Amendment, quite
simply, could not reasonably be understood to be absolute, by
way of the metaphor that would become the universal
shorthand for this most intractable quandary: “The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”20 The
Court’s early free speech jurisprudence struggled mightily to
identify an appropriate test for managing the stubborn First
Amendment problem of an absolute right that could not be
absolute. It had a number of options. The Court could have
just thrown up its hands and said “we’re not touching this
issue.” For much of the Court’s history, it effectively did just
this – not unlike the way it had done in 1849 with another
discrete provision in the Constitution: the guarantee of a
republican form of government in Art. IV, §4.21
But with the turn of the 20th century, the Court began to
confront the First Amendment dilemma head on. It would not
take long for Justice Holmes, after considerable trial and error,
to come to the realization that a highly malleable balancing
test was not the optimal solution. In his famous dissent in
Abrams v. United States, he implored the Court to adopt a
much more rigorous test – one that was fixed and precise.22
Justice Holmes proclaimed that even in the context of war, “the
principle of the right to free speech is always the same.”23
What he proposed now looked completely unlike the balancing
he had utilized in Schenck earlier in that very same year.24
Justice Holmes made it clear that suppression should only be
permitted where there was a “present danger of immediate evil
19. Id. at 52.
20. Id.
21. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
22. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
23. Id. at 628.
24. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47.
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or an intent to bring it about . . . .”25 This was no flexible
balancing standard. It was a rule: one either passed or failed.
Over time, variations of the Holmes formulation – forged
in multiple dissents alongside Louis Brandeis – would gain
currency on the Court. However, it would take time for the
test’s precise form to solidify; as a standard, the clear and
present danger test would remain in flux for many decades.
Justice Jackson quipped: “All agree that it means something
very important, but no two seem to agree on what it is.”26 Long
after the departure of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the Court
would continue to speak out both sides of its mouth, at once
utilizing the firm and unbending “clear and present danger”
language of the preeminent justices, but in application
imposing it as a malleable balancing test. Dennis v. United
States, a 1951 red-scare era decision, is perhaps the most
notable example of how the Court straddled this line.27
In this deeply conflicted – and today, widely condemned
and discredited – decision, the Court moved in concert with a
country consumed by “Cold War hysteria” that was believed by
many to have “infected the judges’ reasoning.”28 A plurality of
the Court, utilizing an unabashedly balance-based variant of
the clear and present danger Test, allowed for the conviction of
the major leaders of the Communist Party USA while explicitly
citing the Court’s movement over time toward a “HolmesBrandeis rationale.”29 The defendants’ crime was neither
attempting to nor advocating to overthrow the government, but
rather, merely conspiring to advocate such overthrow by
organizing the teaching of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.30 Under
the plurality’s rationale, the clear and present danger
requirement was to be applied as a balancing test that
considered not merely the existence or non-existence of
imminent danger – what Justice Douglas in dissent would have
limited to circumstances in which “conditions are so critical
25. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628.
26. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 567 n.9.
27. Id. at 494.
28. Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional DecisionMaking, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 118-19 (2005).
29. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507-08.
30. Id. at 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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that there will be no time to avoid the evil that the speech
threatens”31 – but also the “gravity” of the evil presented. As
with any flexible balancing test with multiple variables,
increased severity in one area may mean that a lower threshold
will suffice in another. Because the gravity of the potential
harm was deemed so great – violent overthrow of the
government – the fact that the harm was improbable (and
certainly not imminent) was not an obstacle to conviction.32
In retrospect, there is no question that this approach to the
First Amendment is viewed by most scholars, historians, and
jurists as most regrettable. Even at the time of the Dennis
decision, there was deep disagreement on the Court; it split
into multiple opinions, and only four of the justices agreed on
the use of the particular clear and present danger balancing
test formulation that led to the Communists’ loss.33 Justice
Frankfurter derided the Court’s previous – more categoricallybound – use of the test, while conceding that reinterpreting the
test’s meaning such that “‘clear’ and ‘present’ [now] mean[s] an
entertainable ‘probability’” was, in light of the Court’s
precedent, simply inconsistent.34 In contrast, Justice Jackson,
while also arguing that the clear and present danger test
should not apply in this situation, was fully comfortable with
the test’s prior use under alternate circumstances.35 It would
seem that to Justice Jackson, the Communist threat of the
1950s was different in kind from the “trivialities that were
being prosecuted” in the earlier part of the century when the
test first emerged.36 “Unless we are to hold our Government
captive in a judge-made verbal trap, we must approach the
problem of a well-organized, nation-wide conspiracy . . .
realistically . . . .”37
What is Justice Jackson saying here? A “judge-made verbal
trap” is simply a pejorative description of a categorical rulebased approach, one that takes discretion from the legislature
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 585.
Id. at 509.
See Dennis, 341 U.S. 494.
Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 567-68 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 569.
Id. at 568-69.
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by imposing “either/or” rigidity rather than the fluidity of
balancing. While such a methodology may be appropriate in
some contexts, to Justice Jackson, this was not one of them.
Whether it was conceived of as part of the clear and present
danger test, or independent of it, balancing had won the day.
However, other impulses were brewing on the Supreme Court.
Indeed, less than a decade earlier, in what is perhaps some of
the most influential Court dicta in First Amendment
jurisprudential history, the Court had laid out a framework for
an entirely different approach.
The Rise of the Categorical Approach
There can be no question that seeking to generalize the
Supreme Court’s evolving doctrinal rules or standards can be a
risky endeavor. The Court is a moving target – nine moving
targets to be precise. The justices frequently disagree on the
appropriate method of resolving constitutional dilemmas.
Time, context, and social change can sometimes justify a
shifting doctrinal focus, and the Court’s membership itself
changes – and with it the judicial philosophy of the individual
justices. We are often left with the impression that while there
may be a dominant doctrinal structure, its boundaries and
justifications are disconcertingly blurry. Such is the case with
the categorical approach to content-based speech abridgement.
The famous dictum in the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, more than any other decision, helped solidify the
Court’s move toward a categorical structure and away from
balancing.38 Chaplinsky, unlike many of the Supreme Court’s
high-profile First Amendment decisions, addressed nothing as
heady as a proposed violent overthrow of the government.
Instead, the case revolved around a seemingly mundane topic:
the spontaneous exchange of angry and aggressive words –
akin to what one might imagine would precede a barroom
brawl.39 What was critical to the decision was the Court’s
broader-than-necessary assessment of how such so-called
“fighting words,” along with other discrete types of speech,
38. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
39. Id.

11

12

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37:1

were to be treated for First Amendment purposes. This dictum
bears repeating:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
“fighting” words – those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.40
This much-cited language clearly stood for the baseline
proposition that content-based limitations on speech were to be
approached categorically rather than through ad hoc balancing.
As mentioned previously, for many advocates of a vigorously
speech-protective First Amendment, this is a preferred
approach. Yet, the dictum itself was subject to harsh criticism
from many First Amendment scholars.41 Although it has
endured as precedent establishing this two-tiered method of
First Amendment interpretation and as a statement of how
and why this doctrinal approach should operate in practice, it
was deeply flawed.
First, the notion that punishing or
prohibiting the enumerated categorically-excepted classes of
speech does not “raise any Constitutional problem”42 has never
been widely, and certainly not uniformly, accepted. From
40. Id. at 571-72.
41. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom – The Roberts Court,
The First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 414-15
(2013).
42. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added).
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fighting words43 to libel44 to obscenity45 – while entitled to a
lower level of constitutional scrutiny – the Court has
repeatedly concluded that some constitutional protection still
applies.
Excepted categories are not invisible to the
Constitution, as the Chaplinsky dictum implies. Second, and
perhaps most glaring, is the fact that 40 percent (or two of the
five) of the illustrative categories causally laid out as examples
of unprotected speech are largely protected.46 Chaplinsky also
did not profess to provide an exhaustive list of those categories
– leaving many questions for the future. This leads to the third
weakness of the Chaplinsky dictum: on what bases are the
excepted categories to be chosen? Here, Justice Murphy, who
authored Chaplinsky, provides some guidance.
But that
guidance is arguably confusing and flawed. Most troubling, to
many scholars the dictum emphasized the wrong criteria for
determining what categories should fall outside of the First
Amendment’s full protection.47
Chaplinsky conflates two important assertions about how
the First Amendment should work: first, that narrowly cabined
categories of speech are not entitled to the full First
Amendment guarantee (and implicitly that all other speech is
entitled to full protection) and second, that these categorical
exclusions are to be defined, at least in part, by virtue of their
low value as speech.48 Acceptance of the first assertion does
not necessarily require acceptance of the second. Yet, this
conflation has resulted in decades of doctrinal and normative
confusion from prominent scholars and jurists. Some ardently
reject the categorical approach, not because there is something
inherently objectionable about a two-tiered First Amendment,
but because these tiers are seen as inextricably linked to the
premise that the First Amendment allows for judicially
imposed assessments of the relative value of particular
43. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
44. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
46. See, e.g., Sable Comm. of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 131
(1989) (holding that lewd dial-a-porn services are protected expression);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (declaring that profane expression
is protected speech).
47. See infra pp. 21-27.
48. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568.
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speech.49 Many scholars see this premise as a perversion of the
most foundational principle behind the First Amendment, “that
the government has no business evaluating the content of
speech.”50
It is anchored in the idea most eloquently
articulated by Justice Holmes in Abrams that sovereignty of
“we the people” was not to be governance by a Platonic
guardian who has a superior ability to divine what ideas have
value and what ideas do not.51 The widely-accepted “fighting
faiths” of one era, may be “upset” by time, and become the lowvalue speech of another – or vice versa.52 Members of the
modern Court have, on occasions, explicitly, and in strong
language, rejected the value-assessment basis for denying First
Amendment protection to particular speech.53
There are, however, many potential bases for justifying
particular categorical exclusions from full First Amendment
protection. While the Chaplinsky dictum is widely understood
to stand for a categorical approach rooted in an assessment of
particular speech’s relative social value, a close examination of
the language reveals a much more nuanced set of possibilities.
First, the language could be read to impose a strictly (or
predominantly) historic approach to identifying excluded First
Amendment categories.
Indeed, before Justice Murphy
pontificates as to why certain categories have been understood
to be unprotected, he defines these very categories on the basis
of their historically unprotected status, asserting that
regulations on these “certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech . . . have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”54 In other words, Chaplinsky might
be understood not as an invitation for the future – to make
fresh assessments of individual classes of speech and declare
them unprotected – but as a simple statement of historical fact:
a certain fixed set of excepted categories exists by virtue of
their time-tested status. This approach—focusing on historical
49. See infra pp. 21-27.
50. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L.
REV. 297, 300 (1995).
51. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419 (1988).
54. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
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tradition as the criterion to determine whether or not a
particular categorical exclusion exists – has in fact achieved
prominence on the Roberts Court.55 Some scholars have
criticized claims that the particular low-value classes of speech
articulated in Chaplinsky, and others subsequently added by
the Court, are truly rooted in history.56
Nonetheless,
regardless of whether one understands the historical consensus
on certain speech categories to be largely valid, a strategic
exaggeration, or a complete myth, one reading of the
Chaplinsky dictum would seem to endorse this approach.
Furthermore, there might be strong speech-protective
instrumental arguments that favor a tradition-based
justification for the excluded categories that do exist – most
notably, the relative difficulty of adding new unprotected
categories under this model.
A second possible reading of the Chaplinsky dictum might
emphasize that, prior to addressing the purported nominal
social value of certain categories of speech, Justice Murphy
alludes to the harm imposed by such speech. Recall that in
summation, at the conclusion of the sentence that lists the five
illustrative
unprotected
categories,
Justice
Murphy
encapsulates their character as words “which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.”57 In the following sentence, Justice Murphy
highlights the “social interest in order and morality”58 that is
served by inhibiting such expression. Thus, another quite
rational interpretation of Chaplinsky – also consistent with its
language – would be that the categorical approach is
fundamentally about carving out narrow exceptions for classes
of expression that impose intolerable harm. In other words,
the key criterion for excluding from full First Amendment
protection certain categories of speech is the damage caused by
such expression. The language alluding to “slight social value”

55. See Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts
Court and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1339, 1341 (2015).
56. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 2166, 2168 (2015).
57. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
58. Id.
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might simply be understood as reflecting the rather straightforward belief that if something is sufficiently harmful, its
potential social value or utility as an “essential part of any
exposition of ideas” is negated.59
But let us suppose that one does not accept this
interpretation – one that would largely reject the independent
significance of the low-value language in the Chaplinsky
dictum in favor of one that stresses only the harm principle. As
an alternative, one might assert that harm and social-value are
two independent variables – both of which important under
Chaplinsky. In other words, speech may be harmful, but at the
same time have considerable social value, just as completely
harmless speech may have the hollow social value of a
supermarket tabloid. Admittedly, the dictum could be faulted
for being somewhat unclear about the relationship between
these two potentially independent attributes of speech –
perhaps misleadingly implying that they are necessarily
linked. But this ambiguity might be boiled down to poor
draftsmanship – and this would not be the first time the
Supreme Court has been accused of such a sin.
Thus, a third – and also quite palatable – interpretation of
Chaplinsky might view the social-value component of its
rationale as a variable that is thrown into the mix only where
the expression is particularly harmful. In other words, because
the harmful categories articulated also are of “slight social
value,” the cost of a deprivation is “outweighed” by the benefit
of averting harm. Under this third interpretation, the lowvalue attribute only becomes relevant in the case of certain
harmful speech, and is only relevant as a way of doublechecking that the spirit of the First Amendment is not being
infringed when an especially harmful category of speech is
excluded from full First Amendment protection. If we are
confident that this harmful speech we are prohibiting is also
“no essential part of any exposition of ideas”60 and at most, of
“slight” value, we can be more comfortable that on balance,
allowing the abridgment of such speech is the right thing to do.
However, it is unfortunately a fourth interpretation that
59. Id.
60. Id.
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has dominated the scholarship and the judicial interpretation
of Chaplinsky’s dictum.
Under this interpretation, the
categorical approach outlined in the case is foundationally
about something called “low-value” speech. As I shall argue,
this has led to unmerited criticism of the categorical, or twolevel, method of content-based speech protection. Yet, because
it has been repeated so frequently, for so many years, this view
of Chaplinsky lives on. Indeed, First Amendment law school
casebooks are sometimes structured around this “low-value”
distinction.61 Adding to the confusion, it is not always clear
that when the phrase “low value speech” is used, the author is
suggesting that the expression has been deemed less valuable
as speech.
Sometimes “low value” speech is used as a
shorthand catchall for any speech that falls into a less
protected category, regardless of why it has been placed in that
category. It is not uncommon for the words “low value” to be
used to describe speech that passed a certain harm threshold or
that has simply been historically unprotected.
Where the Scholars Stand: A Sampling
There are, as we have seen, many ways of summing up the
doctrinal legacy of Chaplinsky.
The preeminent First
Amendment scholar Ronald K.L. Collins for example, describes
Chaplinsky’s dictum as consisting of just “two separate
prongs . . . the categories prong . . . [and] the low-value speech
prong [which is] premised less on particular categories of
speech than on the value of the expression in question.”62 This
summation, while having the virtue of disaggregating the
categorical approach from the “low-value” one, does not account
for Chaplinsky’s other possible interpretations, all of which
have been reflected at different times in various Supreme
Court decisions.63 The confusion and inconsistency of the
61. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1134 (7th
ed. 2013).
62. Collins, supra note 41, at 417, 422.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551-52 (2012)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (advocating for an intermediate scrutiny approach
that would look to both the harm and value of the speech and balance their
respective weights); Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)
(advocating for history and tradition approach); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
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scholarship in this area is not surprising in light of the Court’s
lack of clarity.
In a widely cited exchange in Northwestern Law Review,
two constitutional law luminaries – Cass Sunstein and Larry
Alexander – sparred about the merits of distinguishing
between low and high value speech. To Sunstein, valuing
speech is something akin to a necessary evil, a “difficult and
unpleasant task” that cannot be avoided in an optimal system
of free expression.64 Indeed, Sunstein conceptualizes value
classification as a speech-protective alternative to the muchworse prospect, “authoriz[ing] government to distinguish
among ideas on their merits.”65 To Sunstein, categorizing
certain speech based upon its content where it “lies somewhat
afield from the core concerns of the first amendment,”66 is
strongly preferred over raw viewpoint discrimination. And
while, according to Sunstein, harm may also be a basis for
categorizing speech as not fully protected, limiting inquiries to
harm alone would be “intolerable.”67 This assessment is
ostensibly rooted in speech-protective concerns.
Sunstein
worries that looking to harm alone would mean opening all
speech to harm analysis and, as a consequence, lowering the
burden for suppressing speech across the board to all categories
of expression.68 However, Sunstein goes on to acknowledge a
concern not rooted in speech-protection: that is, if the harmonly approach were interpreted to mean that an equally
stringent standard applies to all speech, regardless of whether
it is political, commercial, libelous or pornographic.69 To
Sunstein, this approach would “fail to draw lines that ought to
be drawn,” suggesting that, quite simply, all speech is not
created equal.70 Applying the same singular standard to all
speech does not acknowledge this truth. It would also,
according to Sunstein, most likely result in tacit but unspoken
U.S. 444 (1969) (advocating for harm-centered approach).
64. Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV.
555, 557 (1989).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 555.
67. Id. at 558.
68. Id.
69. Sunstein, supra note 64, at 558.
70. Id.
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(and unspeakable) value judgments by courts, covertly playing
a role in their harm analysis.71
Larry Alexander, in contrast, finds no place for “low” and
“high” value distinctions.72 Aside from the practical challenges
of parsing the valuable from the less valuable, Alexander sees
the distinction as resting on an intractable fallacy: “Such
division assume[s] that, for purposes of ‘freedom of speech’
values, ‘speech’ resides in an object, such as a printed page, a
frame of film, or a series of sounds, rather than in the
derivation of meaning from . . . the audience or in the intended
meaning of the speaker.”73 Citing just one example, obscenity,
he points out that a category of unprotected expression cannot
be valued without reference to the context in which it is
received or conveyed.74 Who is to decide whether allegedly
pornographic language in a respected novel is to be interpreted
in light of the entire work (high value) or in isolation (low
value)?75 What if the pornography at issue is utilized as part of
For
a legitimate academic study on human behavior?76
Alexander, the error is not in attempting to distinguish among
different types of speech in order to determine, for First
Amendment purposes, what can or cannot be restricted, but
rather, the use of the value-based taxonomy to accomplish
this.77
The preeminent First Amendment scholar, Daniel Farber,
has likewise rejected the low value distinction, observing that
the Court has historically looked to inconsistent sources to
classify speech.78 Yet, Farber argues that with most categories,
the Court has been more likely to rely upon a harm principle to
justify reduced First Amendment protection.
Farber
conceptualizes the Court’s categorical approach as something
like an automatic compelling interest test.79 The government is
71. Id.
72. Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989).
73. Id. at 547.
74. Id. at 547-48.
75. Id. at 551.
76. Id.
77. Alexander, supra note 72, at 552.
78. Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in
American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 933 (2009).
79. Id. at 932.
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presumed to have a compelling interest in restricting certain
categories of speech, such that as a default proposition an
abridgement of that speech will pass strict scrutiny – whether
it is consumer fraud, perjury in a courtroom, or incitement of
imminent violence.80
Although this is not generally the
language the Court uses to describe its categorical doctrinal
approach, to Farber, it effectively captures what the Court is
typically doing.81 As discussed earlier, there are quite simply
some common sense domains that convincingly suggest that
the First Amendment cannot be absolute. To Farber, these
have typically been limited to categories of speech in which the
state – justifiably – has a compelling interest to regulate.82
However, not all categories have fit this mold. There are
anomalous categories, Farber explains. The Court has justified
these categories primarily on the basis of their inherent “low
value,” and not due to a compelling need to suppress.83 Farber
identifies two such categories: obscenity and commercial
speech.84 “Obscenity seems to be proscribed less because it
threatens a compelling interest and more because the Court
views sexual speech as inherently less valuable than other
kinds of speech.”85 Likewise, the Court’s commercial speech
doctrine is built around a four-part intermediate scrutiny test
that explicitly rejects the need for a compelling state interest to
regulate such expression; instead, the Court requires just a
“substantial interest.”86
So, other than these categories of obscenity and
commercial speech, Farber sees the animating principle behind
unprotected categories to be harm-based, a compelling need by
the government to regulate certain narrow types of speech.
Farber, in other words, inverts a conventional wisdom of many
scholars and jurists – rooted in a common reading of the
Chaplinsky dictum – that the categorical approach is

80. Id. at 919.
81. Id. at 931.
82. Id. at 932.
83. Farber, supra note 78, at 933.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 934.
86. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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necessarily tethered to a concept of “low value” speech.
Instead, he sees the cases where they are tethered as
anomalous. Indeed, he remains troubled by these low-valuejustified categories, expressing concern that the Court’s
treatment of this expression frequently appears “ad hoc.”87 In
the case of obscenity, Farber sees a category that is a mere
“reflection of prudish Puritanism.”88 Thus, although Farber
appears to be critical of the low value criterion, he
characterizes the move toward a categorical approach as “a real
judicial achievement.”89
There is no indication that the categorical approach will be
going away any time soon. In recent decades, many members
of the Court have struck a similar posture, accepting the twotiered methodology, but rejecting as its foundation the “low
value” criterion.90 Justice Stevens favorably cited a lower court
decision proclaiming that the “First Amendment is a value-free
provision . . . .”91 And it is self-evident why a version of the
categorical approach that looks to harm (or the compelling
interest of the state), rather than the ostensible value of the
speech, is favored by free speech advocates. It would seem to
be the narrowest path to resolving the non-absolute absolute
problem. Even if, as a practical reality, the First Amendment
cannot be absolute, at a minimum it would seem to mandate
that governments not be permitted to judge the value of speech
for society – or more importantly, for any one individual.
Rather, they may only restrict speech where it is absolutely
necessary – where there is a compelling interest and no viable
alternative.
This harm approach, of course, does come with its own set
of risks. Just like the dubious endeavor of determining a
universal value of particular speech, a compelling state interest
may equally be in the eye of the beholder. In other words,
could the harm principle be grease for the descent down a
slippery slope? Should every new claim by a government that
it has the power to abridge a certain category of speech turn on
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Farber, supra note 78, at 919, 935.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 921.
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419 (1988) (citations omitted).
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the eloquence of its “compelling” justification? Governments
establish new policies every day, and in doing so make new
arguments for why these policies are of the utmost importance.
Some might fear that the compelling interest model is an open
call for new categories of First Amendment exclusion, a recipe
for expanding rather than circumscribing speech suppression.
The New History and Tradition Emphasis
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Roberts, the Court’s
open embrace of the categorical approach has continued to
grow in zeal. However, when it comes to defining those
categories, its focus has shifted to another aspect of the
Chaplinsky dictum, and the history and tradition of excluding
the category of speech at issue. Gregory Magarian argues that
this emphasis is indeed new – akin to “major conceptual
innovation” – despite the Court’s insistence that by focusing on
tradition, it is merely following in the footsteps of the Court’s
free speech precedents.92 Magarian may be correct to observe
that the reasoning in the Court’s recent First Amendment
decisions has shifted; however, it is a shift that is arguably
rooted in the original Chaplinsky dictum – the case that first
planted the categorical seed, flawed and imprecise as its
language may have been. The setting of this observed shift is
also notable. As an area of First Amendment law with an
unfortunate legacy of doctrinal ambiguity, the Roberts Court’s
“categorical” free speech cases were decided in the context of
this longstanding need for clarity. The Court was, in other
words, simply filling a void. The Court has stressed tradition
(or the absence thereof) in a cluster of content-based cases in
which it was asked to carve out new categories of unprotected
speech,93 and the Court was in the position of justifying its
repeated answer: “No.”
Magarian is nonetheless quite critical of the traditionbased analysis that is taking center stage at the same time
92. Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court
and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1339, 1347 (2015).
93. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460; Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786 (2011).
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that low value and harm-centered justifications fade into the
background.94 Magarian offers a nuanced assessment of a
categorical approach that at once lauds the Court for its profree speech destination while largely lamenting the route the
Court has taken to get there.95 Of course, history and tradition
are hallmarks of contemporary conservative constitutional
analysis, and this reliance on the past is hardly limited to the
arena of free speech. Thus, some of the very same criticisms
that might apply to the use of history and tradition more
broadly may apply with equal vigor to the First Amendment.
Magarian takes issue with the potential for manipulation of
this historical approach, i.e. “the fact that reasonable people
disagree both about what traditions exist and about how, and
how much, tradition should matter” and whether judges have
the “institutional competence” to play the role of historians.96
One might also lament the way tradition may be used to
obscure the underlying substantive reasons for the Court’s
decision,97 and stress that limiting speech protection to what
was traditionally afforded might ultimately defeat the broader
constitutional purpose of preventing current political majorities
from suppressing current minorities.98
Regardless of how one generally stands on the heavy
reliance on history and tradition so characteristic of today’s
conservatives, it must be acknowledged that the First
Amendment is its own distinctive area of jurisprudence, with
its own doctrinal challenges and substantive concerns. The
tradition-based orientation has some undeniable benefits (from
a free speech perspective) when used in conjunction with the
categorical approach.
Specifically, it may allay reticence
associated with the “low value” and “harm-based” routes to
defining unprotected categories. On its face, it would seem to
stop both justifications in their tracks. Under the history and
tradition construct, there is slim likelihood of new broad
declarations that some as-of-yet-undeclared category of speech
is not “valuable,” and thus unprotected.
Enlightened
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Magarian, supra note 55.
Id.
Id. at 1356.
Id.
Id. at 1357.
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modernity just won’t cut it under a tradition-based analysis. If
misogynistic speech by men-being-men in 1950 was, at the
time, a socially-valued display of masculinity, but is today
thought to be of “low-value” or even “valueless” by a majority of
Americans, such speech would still remain protected; there
would simply be no longstanding history or tradition of
allowing its suppression.
A similar principle would be true of the slippery slope
concerns endemic to a harm-based approach. If it wasn’t
“compelling” yesterday to suppress a particular category of
speech, under the history and tradition approach, it is not
enough for it to be “compelling” today. Like a fine wine, history
and tradition require patience. The ultimate effect of the
history and tradition approach, in other words, is to profoundly
limit the ability of courts or policy makers to expand the list of
categories to which free speech is not guaranteed. Granted, as
the Court has acknowledged, “[m]aybe there are some
categories of speech that have been historically unprotected,
but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as
such in our case law.”99 However, it would presumably be a
daunting task to substantiate such a class, particularly with
many decades of vigorous free speech litigation behind us.
Presumably, most historically rooted First Amendment
exceptions, if they exist at all, have been identified by now. In
this respect, the history and tradition approach is likely to be
highly speech-protective.
However, these advantages can also cut in the opposite
direction. History and tradition might have the effect of
locking in the poor categorical choices of the past – perhaps like
obscenity or fighting words – even when the justification for
unprotected status may appear to be anachronistic to much of
the population. A harm or low-value based assessment of
categorical exclusions – as opposed to a history and tradition
analysis – might mean greater responsiveness to the present.
Sexually explicit material that was once considered so deeply
offensive that a vast majority of the country “knew it when
they saw it,” today, may elicit a mere shrug, and to many
others even represent a powerful (and valuable) expression of
99. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
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what it means to be human.
Abrasive face-to-face
confrontational language that, in an earlier era, appeared
harmful as a matter of common sense – because no “selfrespecting man” would allow such words to be spoken without
resorting to immediate physical retaliation – today, may
appear to be an expression of passion that projects the
intensity of a genuine human reaction, one that has value in its
forceful conveyance of an idea. What were once “fighting
words” may today appear, at worst, to be “bad form.” One
might feel that the speaker could have found a more productive
way to express his anger, but not, as in the past, assume that
such words will naturally result in a violent, physical response.
Our understanding of “value” and “harm” changes over time. A
history and tradition approach might prevent us from
correcting mistakes from the past – or, at minimum, updating
First Amendment doctrine to reflect contemporary reality –
and returning a formerly unprotected category to protected
status.
Indeed, we might look to the 1971 decision of Cohen v.
California as an example of such correcting for the past.100
Almost three decades had passed since the Chaplinsky Court
casually tossed “the profane” into its list of too-obvious-forelaboration categorical exceptions to First Amendment
protection.101 Yet, in Cohen, the Court unequivocally declared
that the display of the words “F*** the Draft” on one’s clothing
was protected speech.102 Explicitly relying upon the two-level
approach, the Court concluded that “this case cannot be said to
fall within those relatively few categories of instances where
prior decisions have established the power of government to
deal more comprehensively with certain forms of individual
expression.”103 It reasoned that this crude language did not, on
its own, fall within the established categories of obscenity or
fighting words, or of intentionally provoking a group to a
hostile reaction.104 Although the Court did not describe its
100. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
101. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
102. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16, 26.
103. Id. at 19-20.
104. Id. at 20. The only caveat being that, since Cohen, the Court has
shown some willingness to allow for certain limited restrictions on profanity
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decision as such, Cohen might be seen as an example of the
Court unaccepting a class of expression – returning it to fully
protected status. In this enlightened period of the early 1970s,
the Court’s moderately conservative Justice Harlan famously
observed – in a manner that was perhaps invisible to a
previous generation – that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s
lyric.”105 While the outcome of a historical counterfactual may
be stubbornly resistant to proof, we might reasonably conclude
that if the Court of 1971 had been as wedded to “history and
tradition” as today’s Court, it may have been much more
reluctant to quietly read “profanity” out of the Chaplinsky
formulation.
Nevertheless, framing constitutional doctrine is often more
about working within the confines of reality than it is about
finding perfection. The framers did not provide perfection.
Since an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment is
untenable, the Court must struggle to find the next best
alternative. Each choice is bound to be fraught with distinct
disadvantages, providing unlimited fodder for law review
articles and openings for clever First Amendment lawyers.
This truth is also what makes choosing not to choose – by, for
example, declining to adequately define and delimit established
unprotected categories – and simply opting, instead, for a
covert form of ad hoc balancing, so tempting. Drawing a bold
line according to “history and tradition” may be subject to a
range of justifiable criticisms, yet First Amendment scholars
may, at the same time, rightfully celebrate the clarity of the
line, for this line has amounted to some impressively speechprotective decisions.
It led the Court in 2010 to reject the claim that depictions
of animal cruelty should be declared a new category of
similar to traditional “time, place and manner” limitations. These decisions
do not permit full scale prohibitions of profane speech; they merely allow
narrow restrictions under limited circumstances – such as limiting broadcast
on publicly accessible radio that include profanity to times children are less
likely to be listening (see F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)), or
imposing zoning restrictions that limit the location or density of adult
establishments. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425
(2002); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young
v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
105. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
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unprotected speech.106 The Court heavily rooted its decision in
United States v. Stevens in the history and tradition rubric,
emphasizing the government’s failure to identify a “tradition
excluding depictions of animal cruelty from ‘the freedom of
speech.’”107 This, in itself, is notable. But what is arguably
even more significant was the Court’s seeming rejection of a
categorical analysis based in harm and low value – at least in
the raw form proposed by the defenders of the law.
As a method of determining whether a new exception to
First Amendment coverage should be added, the government
proposed “a categorical balancing of the value of the speech
against its societal costs.”108 Of course, the Chaplinsky dictum
does not dictate that its “low value” and “harm” based
justifications be used in conjunction with one another, nor that
they be employed as part of a balancing test. It could just as
easily be understood to provide a strict cut-off: speech with
harm above x threshold or speech with value below y threshold
is unprotected by the First Amendment, case closed.
Nevertheless, the Court’s reliance on a tradition-based analysis
allowed it to outright reject the government’s formulation, one
that would seem to permit an open-ended consideration of a
limitless array of newly-proposed categories for First
Amendment exclusion under the purported logic that the
expression at hand is particularly harmful or valueless. The
Court was alarmed by such a suggestion. “As a free-floating
test for First Amendment coverage,” the Stevens majority
asserted that the government’s proposal was “startling and
dangerous.”109
The Court was making an important point. Conventional
wisdom and sheer intuition might suggest that a categorical
approach, by cabining those few narrow areas of expression
that cannot be offered full protection and guaranteeing the
rest, is highly speech protective. However, this is only so if it is
structured as a disciplined and circumscribed rule, and not a
loose and malleable standard.
Calling one’s approach
“categorical” is not enough to distinguish it from the case-by106.
107.
108.
109.

See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 470.
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case balancing that many First Amendment advocates decry.
Indeed, embracing balancing as part of a two-level methodology
might be more dangerous to First Amendment values, for
unlike case-by-case balancing, a categorical balance speaks to
an entire category of speech and has the power to declare vast
areas of expression unprotected. The Stevens Court does not
equivocate on this point:
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech
does not extend only to categories of speech that
survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social
costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself
reflects a judgment by the American people that
the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs.110
What Kind of Categorical Approach?
So, even when we move past the debate over whether or
not to employ a categorical approach, we must confront the
question of how this categorical approach will work. Should
balancing play any role whatsoever in a two-tier First
Amendment analysis? Is it ever possible to completely do away
with balancing, or is it simply a matter of degree? And what do
we mean by “balancing?” Are there alternative methods of
balancing that may be used within, or in order to define,
particular categories? Although the Court, in the years since
Chaplinsky, has offered neither clarity nor consistency on these
questions, they are matters that have been considered by
scholars.
As we saw above, the Court in Stevens dismissed the
government’s suggestion that unprotected categories be
determined through a cost benefit analysis, pejoratively
referring to this as “ad hoc balancing.”111 However, scholars
such as Melville Nimmer have traditionally distinguished the
kind of balancing that might be used to define entire
unprotected categories of speech from an open-ended balancing
110. Id.
111. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460-61.
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that would assess each claim of unprotected speech
independently.112 The former, often referred to as “definitional”
or “categorical” balancing, was distinguished from “ad hoc”
balancing, and was considered more speech protective because
it “takes place at a higher level of generalization.”113 Thus,
although some balancing might be understood to be essential,
to Nimmer, what was critical was that definitional balancing
(very much unlike ad hoc balancing) resulted in a clear rule
that could be used in future cases.114 Accepting that such
balancing must occur acknowledges a vitally important and
difficult role for judges, for they must use their judgment to
balance interests.115 However, with definitional balancing,
they are drawing boundaries not only for the present – for the
case at hand – but for the future as well.116 The stakes are, in
this sense, much higher than with ad hoc balancing. But these
higher stakes serve many speech-protective interests. These
stakes may make a court much more reluctant to deny free
speech in a particular case because doing so requires setting a
categorical precedent that will likely have profound
repercussions.
A clear rule resulting from definitional
balancing also provides greater certainty for both future
speakers and future regulators who will act with greater
confidence in their expressive (or regulatory) choices without
fear that their words will be unprotected or their regulations
will be deemed unconstitutional. It reduces the risk of selfcensorship by speakers who might have good reason to be
insecure; after all, who can predict the outcome of an ad hoc
balance of one particular court? It also provides clarity for a
government regulator with an interest in combatting a narrow
type of especially harmful expression.
Constraints, which come in many forms, are a big piece of
what makes a legal system distinguishable from politics. Ad
hoc balancing, however, significantly frees judges from
112. See Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor
Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a
Methodology for Determining the “Visible Boundaries of the First
Amendment,” 39 AKRON L. REV. 483, 489-94 (2006).
113. Id. at 490.
114. Id. at 491.
115. Id. at 492.
116. Id. at 491.
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constraint and gives them the freedom to act more like
politicians to be responsive to public pressure, personal
predilection, and ideology. As Nimmer pointed out, it is
moments of “national hysteria” when the values of free speech
become most critical,117 and when the all-too- natural human
impulse for judges to balance away First Amendment rights
becomes hardest to resist.118 As the red-scare-era Dennis
decision discussed earlier illustrates, accepting ad hoc
balancing means giving courts greater leeway to make
decisions that, in retrospect, may turn out to be highly
regrettable.
Thus, for Nimmer, balancing itself is not the enemy of free
speech, as long as that balance is used categorically and not
case-by-case.119 We might note however, that the Stevens
Court in 2010 collapsed definitional balancing and ad hoc
balancing. By referring to the government’s proposed approach
as “ad hoc balancing,” rather than how it would be traditionally
labeled – “definitional balancing” – the Court was sending a
message that the government’s approach to definitional
balancing had some of the same free speech dangers
traditionally equated with a case-by-case approach.120 In other
words, the government’s category-by-category approach looked
eerily similar to case-by-case ad hoc balancing. The Court’s
critique does not come out of thin air.
Alexander Aleinikoff, one of the most prominent scholarly
critics of balancing, has argued that even in the categorical
setting, balancing should – and can – be avoided.121 Indeed
Aleinikoff – apparently like the contemporary Roberts Court –
sees little difference between definitional balancing and ad hoc
balancing; as he explained, “[n]ew situations present new
interests and different weights for old interests. If these are
allowed to re-open the balancing process, then every case
becomes one of an ‘ad hoc’ balance . . . .”122 To Aleinikoff, the
117. Id. at 492.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 489.
120. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460.
121. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
122. Id. at 980.
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widely-held assertion that balancing is inevitable once one
recognizes that a particular constitutional right cannot be
absolute is simply incorrect.123 Even though (as discussed) the
First Amendment was drafted in absolutist language,
categorical exceptions to free speech need not be explained as a
result of a balancing of the interests at stake or a cost-benefit
analysis. They may be understood “as resting upon a principle
internal to the constitutional provision.”124 Yes, the imperative
to carve out a free speech exception for revealing military
secrets that would imperil the country’s likelihood of success
during wartime might be explained as a rational balance in
which a court decides that the sacrifice of freedom involved is
less weighty than the costs of maintaining that freedom.
However, to Aleinikoff, such categorical exception could just as
easily be explained by way of a principle internal to the First
Amendment, that the freedoms within its ambit are premised
upon a political system that survives, and functions
effectively.125 Other scholars have pointed to a range of First
Amendment values – even though unspecified in the
Amendment itself – that may be used to identify excepted
categories. These may come from many sources, including the
philosophical, historic or political origins underlying the
amendment and constitution as a whole.126 These values, in
conjunction with an array of interpretive techniques, may
coherently justify particular excluded categories without resort
to balancing.127
Balancing, in other words, even of the
definitional variety favored by Nimmer, should not be
presumed to be an essential part of a categorical approach to
the First Amendment.
Regardless of where one stands one the foundations of the
categorical approach to the First Amendment, whether one
adopts a low-value, harm-based, or “history and tradition”
justification for the categories chosen, or some combination of
these three, or whether one believes balancing to be an
inevitable part of the categorical approach or something that is
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 995.
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Deutsch, supra note 112, at 497.
Id.
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avoidable and ideally should be avoided, there is also
commonality. Once one accepts the categorical methodology as
the preferred approach, which many scholars and a majority of
the Court have done, it becomes a matter of great interest to
assess how it is actually used. It is one thing to say that the
categorical or two-level approach will or should be used in the
case of a content-based governmental abridgement of speech,
but it is another to see how it plays out in practice. It is this
question that I move to next. For purposes of this inquiry, I
will focus on one particular category chosen by the Court for
special non- or lesser-protected First Amendment status: true
threats.
Categories, and More Categories
Frederick Schauer has observed that “[t]here are an
infinite number of ways of drawing distinctions and therefore
an infinite number of potential categories.”128
Since
Chaplinsky, not only has the number of lesser-protected
categories grown, but as the Court’s precedents have fleshed
out each such category individually, nuances and
idiosyncrasies have become evident.
It has become
increasingly clear that each category serves a distinct
purpose.129 In practice, this has meant that the image of a
categorical approach as simple dichotomous, either-or
proposition is inapposite. Indeed, today, calling the categorical
approach a “two-level” methodology is somewhat misleading.
Because “not all forms of speech are necessarily amenable to
the same analytic approach,”130 the Court has developed
distinctive methodologies for lesser-protected categories of
expression.131 Even as the categories themselves are relatively
static, these methodologies for individual categories have
continued to evolve in response to new fact patterns and social
understandings that are ever changing.
Three-quarters of a century ago, commercial speech was
128. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in
Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 285 (1981).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 286.
131. Id. at 286-87.
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said to receive no First Amendment protection – declared to be
an unprotected category just one month after Chaplinsky was
decided.132 However, over time, the Court determined that
commercial speech was deserving of some protection.133 Over
this same period, the definition of commercial speech was
narrowed and specified with greater precision.134 By 1980, in
an opinion drafted by Justice Powell, the Court settled on a
four-part test tailored specifically for commercial speech,
widely understood to represent a form of intermediate
scrutiny.135 The Central Hudson test was the product of a
Justice keenly aware of the need for clarity vis-à-vis the
categorical method. Justice Powell’s law clerk David O.
Stewart – who worked on an original draft of the Central
Hudson opinion – recounted how Justice Powell “worried that
the Court’s opinions should provide clear guidance to lawyers
and judges about how to apply the ruling in future cases. As a
lifelong practicing lawyer, he was very sensitive to that
concern.”136 In a 1980 memo to Justice Powell, Stewart agreed
that now was the time: with commercial speech it seemed
“appropriate to try to apply a disciplined approach instead of
the more ad-hoc balancing methods used in the earlier
cases.”137
The story was similar with defamation – a type of speech
that was listed in the Chaplinsky dictum as an example of an
unprotected category.138 Defamation would receive a speechprotective makeover in the celebrated New York Times v.
Sullivan case of 1964.139 In Sullivan, and a series of cases in
132. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
133. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
134. Id. at 762.
135. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
136. Ronald K.L. Collins, FAC 6 (First Amendment Conversations)
Powell Law Clerk David O. Stewart Discusses the Origins of Central Hudson’s
4-Prong
Test,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS
(Jan.
28,
2016),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2016/01/fac-6-first-amendmentconversations-powell-law-clerk-david-o-stewart-discusses-the-origins-ofcentral-hudsons-4-prong-test.html.
137. Id.
138. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
139. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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its wake, the Court qualified and dramatically narrowed the
types of defamation that may be subject to civil damages,
protecting defamatory speech directed against government
officials and public figures unless that defamatory falsehood is
made with actual malice.140
Commercial speech and defamation provide just two
illustrations of how the Court might adapt the categorical
approach to the complex nature of human expression.
Although it may seem desirable to adopt a streamlined twolevel methodology in which all non-protected categories of
speech are subject to the same analysis, such an approach
would come at a high cost. There is often good reason to
establish different tests for different categories of speech. Each
category presents its own unique set of concerns – distinctive
harms and distinctive speech interests. One cannot, for
example, fairly assert that the democratic significance of being
able to freely criticize public officials – even where the factual
foundation for such criticisms prove to be false – is somehow
equivalent to the economic effects of making dubious claims
about a product in a commercial advertisement. As Schauer
points out:
Freedom of speech need not have any one
“essential” feature. It is much more likely a
bundle of interrelated principles sharing no
common set of necessary and sufficient defining
characteristics. It is quite possible that the
protection of political discussion and criticism,
the aversion to censorship of art, and the desire
to retain open inquiry in science and other
academic disciplines, for example, are principles
not reducible to any one common core.141
Threats, like commercial speech and defamation, come
with their own distinctive set of concerns. On a common-sense
level, threats seem remarkably simple. The straight-forward

140. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 254.
141. Schauer, supra note 128, at 277.
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definition of a “threat” is uncontroversial: “a statement that
expresses the speaker’s intention to harm the target.”142 As
discussed in the beginning of this piece, threats present the
quintessential illustration of why we need First Amendment
exceptions: it would be the very rare individual who does not
see a need to punish the words “your money or your life.” At
the same time, relative to other excepted categories of speech –
such as child pornography, commercial speech and defamation
– defining a threat in the real world can be remarkably
difficult.
Human expression is deeply contextual. ‘Expressing an
intention to harm’ could include the physical insecurity
imposed by an aggressive negotiator who affords little personal
space to his listener, and who speaks with sharp language and
great intensity. Body language, facial expressions and physical
proximity – even without explicitly threatening words – may,
to many, convey a threat. On the other hand, threatening
words of the most direct variety, which may, if printed on a
piece of paper, leave no doubt that a threat was present, might
have a completely different meaning when heard in context.
The threatening words might have been quoting someone else’s
speech from long in the past, or might have been spoken by a
comedian on a stage. They might convey irony, sarcasm or
hyperbole. Furthermore, a threat, unlike child pornography,
requires subjective perception. A listener might hear a threat
when the speaker only intended to convey excitement. An
ineffectual provocateur may do everything within her power to
threaten her targeted victims, yet her words may be laughed
off by everyone in earshot – taken by no one as a serious threat.
And what of the socially tone-deaf listener? She might not feel
threatened by words that a reasonable person – in a similar
context – would perceive to be a threat. Should this speech be
protected? And what of the tone-deaf speaker whose words
would reasonably be interpreted as a threat, but who had no
intention to threaten, or who lacked knowledge that his
expression would likely be interpreted as a threat?
These are difficult questions. With a categorical approach,

142. Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern
First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1355-56 (2006).
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however, difficult questions are inevitable. It may be clear that
a categorical exception for a certain type of speech is needed,
but this is just the first step. To avoid relapsing into ad hoc
balancing, the courts must next move on to the crucial business
of getting into the weeds. Distinctions must be parsed, and
difficult questions must be answered in a principled manner.
This takes courage, because Supreme Court precedents are not
easily undone. But a categorical approach without defined
categories is arguably worse than a half-measure; over time, it
may become a constitutional wound. It says: we will take the
profound (but necessary) step of declaring an entire category of
speech outside the ambit of a constitutional provision that is,
by its own terms, absolute, but we will not finish the job. We
will allow lower courts to come to a range of inconsistent
conclusions about how that categorical exclusion should work
in practice.
With many areas of constitutional law, leaving open
unanswered questions is not terribly problematic. However,
the concerns are much greater with speech. For the longer the
high court sits back and declines to decide, the more
uncertainty settles in. The Court’s own precedents, in fact,
have acknowledged a sort of special status for free speech,
requiring greater precision from First Amendment decisions
than is required in other areas of constitutional adjudication.143
As the Court itself has many times acknowledged (and many
tyrannical leaders have long understood), legal insecurity is
one of the most potent enemies of expressive freedom. Where it
is unclear what one may or may not say without legal sanction,
where one’s fate is in the hands of a court that might – or
might not – decide that one’s speech is unprotected, where one
has little ability to predict which way a court will rule, selfcensorship is a likely result.
Fifty years ago, the Court delved into the weeds with
regard to the excluded speech-category of defamation. With a
keen sensitivity to the First Amendment stakes at hand, the
Court rejected an ad hoc case-by-case approach and articulated
143. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972) (establishing
that the overbreadth doctrine allows courts to strike down overly broad laws
that risk impinging on free speech even where the defendant could
constitutionally be penalized).
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crisp rules for determining when speech is unprotected
defamation and when even defamatory speech is to be shielded
by the First Amendment from liability.144 This allowed for
certainty where there was formerly insecurity. It gave the
press freedom to aggressively criticize political leaders without
the speech-inhibiting fear that an inadvertent factual error
would lead to financial ruin. New York Times v. Sullivan was,
as Alexander Meiklejohn put it, an “occasion for dancing in the
streets.”145 When it comes to threats, however, the contrast
could not be greater. The Court has distinguished so-called
“true threats” from all others – explaining that only “true
threats” are unprotected.146 However, other than providing
this initial distinction, the Court’s guidance on the true threats
category has been despairingly paltry.
The True Threats Category
In 1969, the First Amendment was on an upswing. This
was the year Watts v. U.S. was decided, the first official
acknowledgment of a categorical exception to the First
Amendment for true threats.147 This final year of the Warren
Court was an optimistic period for free speech jurisprudence.
The Court seemed to understand that an embrace of a
categorical approach meant a concomitant responsibility to
define with precision just what those categories were. Not only
had the Court just decided New York Times v. Sullivan five
years earlier, clarifying and narrowing the defamation
exclusion, in Brandenburg v. Ohio it had just resolved the most
vexing and longstanding of categorical first amendment
issues.148 Here, it decisively cast off the balancing approach of
Dennis in favor of a clear and circumscribed definition of
incitement.149
To fall outside of the First Amendment’s
144. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Associated
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
145. Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (1964).
146. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
147. Id.
148. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
149. Id.
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protection, “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation . . .
[must be] directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and . . . [must be] likely to incite or produce such
action.”150 In one fell swoop, the mother lode of categorical
dilemmas – one that had plagued the Court for fifty years –
was largely resolved. Through a principled and relatively
precise articulation of the category of incitement, the Court
radically narrowed the freedom of future courts to do what was
done in Dennis, to bend to the political and social pressures of
the times and expand the ambit of an unprotected category at
will.
Watts, while not as ambitious as Brandenburg, was of the
same cloth. The setting was at the time remarkably routine: a
public rally at the Washington mall addressing war and peace
and police brutality.151 The ostensibly threatening statement
was made by an 18 year-old malcontent who had just been
drafted.152 His words – “If they ever make me carry a rifle the
first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” – were followed
by laughter by both the speaker and the audience.153 It took
just a few short pages for the Court, in a per curiam decision, to
blithely dismiss the notion that “the kind of political hyperbole
indulged in by the petitioner” could be prosecuted as a crime.154
This was apparently not a difficult decision, judging from its
brevity, but it was a significant one. For not only did the Court
definitively assert that true threats are an unprotected
category of speech – the statute making threats against the
president unlawful was declared facially constitutional – it
reflected a very particular way of understanding the categorical
approach to the First Amendment.155
Definitions must be clearly delineated. “What is a threat
must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected
speech,” said the Court.156 How is this to be done? The Watts
Court embraced a decidedly harm-based approach. There was
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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no talk of the “low value” of threatening language. Instead, the
Court acknowledged the “overwhelming” governmental interest
in keeping the president both safe and free to fulfill his duties
without “threats of physical violence.”157 At the same time, it
stressed that, even in light of this compelling interest, “the
commands of the First Amendment [must be kept] clearly in
mind.”158 Ultimately, Watts did not go beyond telling us what a
true threat is not: it is not “political hyperbole.”159 However,
the case set the stage for a much more in depth articulation of
the contours of true threats, and considering the Court’s recent
track record of taking categorical definitions seriously, it would
have been reasonable to surmise that in the coming years, the
Court would take up that opportunity, rather than simply
letting the lower courts flail about. But then, there was
silence . . . decades of silence.
The next significant decision addressing the category of
true threats would not come until 2003. Unfortunately, not
only did the Court wait far too long to return to the issue, it
would do so in a decision that proved deeply unsatisfying to
many on all sides of the free speech divide. As in Watts, the
Court did not ultimately uphold a true threat. Once again, the
Court simply told us what a true threat could not be. This
time, with a mere plurality, the Court concluded that the
“prima facie evidence provision” in a Virginia criminal law that
banned cross burning was inconsistent with the First
Amendment because it meant that the burning of a cross alone
could suffice for conviction.160 The plurality reasoned that,
while a symbolic cross burning may constitute “constitutionally
proscribable intimidation” – i.e. a “true threat” – it may just as
well have another meaning.161 “[S]ometimes the cross burning
is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity. It is a
ritual used at Klan gatherings, and it is used to represent the
Klan itself. Thus, ‘[b]urning a cross at a political rally would
almost certainly be protected expression.’”162
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–423 (1996)).
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 364 (2003).
Id. at 365.
Id. at 365-66.
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On its face, the holding in Virginia v. Black was a speech
protective one: The symbolic expression at issue was protected
by the Constitution. At the same time, a majority of the Court
strongly stated – in what was effectively just dicta – that “a
State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross
burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.”163 This
conclusion was reached despite the fact that by a conventional
definition, intimidation is not synonymous with a threat.
Granted, true “threats” might be said to be, by definition,
“intimidating” – particularly if we are, in part, defining a true
threat as one that would be effective to a reasonable person. A
threat that is not “intimidating” would presumably not be a
threat harmful enough to merit exclusion from First
Amendment protection. However, the reverse would likely not
be said to hold true. The Court acknowledges as much, in its
thoroughly
circular
and
self-evident
assertion
that
“[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat
to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the
victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”164 The Court glosses
over what would seem to be a very important and troubling
ambiguity when it qualifies the term “intimidation” by “in the
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word.”165
“Intimidating” expression is not necessarily “threatening.”
Indeed, intimidation is a common expressive tactic used in all
sorts of social settings. Intimidation may be a subconscious
byproduct of a speaker with great passion or emotion
attempting to convey his feelings to a relatively stoic crowd.
Heated exchanges over politics, race, sex, or religion are
frequently volatile and can quickly become intimidating to a
listener. And a particularly sensitive individual may be more
likely to feel intimidated than someone with a thicker skin.
Threats are, in other words, a subset of intimidating
expression. By using the term “intimidate” throughout the
opinion as if it were synonymous with “threaten,” the Court
obscures the important issues raised about the true threats
category. The Court’s reasoning further muddied an already
163. Id. at 343.
164. Id. at 360.
165. Black, 538 U.S. at 360.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1

40

2016 CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO FREE SPEECH

41

muddy categorical river. This conflation of intimidation and
threat caused much confusion.
Furthermore, as Frederick Schauer has pointed out, a
threat has traditionally been confined to a face-to-face
confrontation in which a single individual – or relatively small
group – is “[placed] . . . in reasonable fear for his personal
safety (or personal well-being in a larger sense).”166 However,
cross-burnings were historically used to intimidate entire
populations and large swaths of racial, religious, and other
minorities.
Virginia’s statute was seemingly drafted to
incorporate such broad based intimidation, as well as
intimidation against a single target. By failing to clarify what
types of intimidation of “group[s] of persons” (in the statute’s
words) qualify as a true threat, the Court arguably threw into
question a central assumption about what an unprotected
threat looks like. Indeed, one might be tempted to interpret
Virginia v. Black as an expansion of the true threats
categorical exception such that it now includes so-called hate
speech directed at minority groups. Yet, the plurality, near the
end of the opinion, unequivocally tells us that this is not the
case: “It may be true that a cross burning, even at a political
rally, arouses a sense of anger or hatred among the vast
majority of citizens who see a burning cross. But this sense of
anger or hatred is not sufficient to ban all cross burnings.”167
However, proponents of hate speech laws frequently point to its
intimidating impact on minority groups, even when such hate
speech does not come in the form of an explicit threat. In other
words, it is hardly clear that hate speech and intimidation do
not largely overlap. Thus, for a number of reasons, the dream
that the Court would at last add some clarity to the true
threats category were dashed in Virginia v. Black.
Yet, on one front, the Court did seem to speak with
consistency, a consistency that had the potential to answer a
long-debated query about the true threats exception: In order
to be excluded from First Amendment protection, does a threat
require subjective intent by the speaker? The locus of the
dispute in Black turned on the law’s prima facie presumption
166. Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First
Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 213 (2003).
167. Black, 538 U.S. at 366.
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that there was an “intent to intimidate” wherever there is a
cross burning.168 The plurality could not countenance this
presumption, describing the many alternative communicative
intentions that might underlie a cross burning.169
In
condemning the constitutionality of the prima facie provision of
the Virginia law, the plurality points to the fact that “[i]t does
not distinguish between a cross burning done with the purpose
of creating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with
the purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim.”170 The
clear implication is that intentionality is critical. A cross
burning intended to create only anger could certainly
intimidate observers, but the Court seemed to be suggesting
that the subjective purpose needs to be intimidation for such
symbolic speech to be unprotected.
Or not. It turned out that in the years following Black,
scholars and judges would come to inconsistent conclusions as
to how Black should be interpreted. This confusion was not
limited to the relationship between “intimidation” and “true
threats;” it extended to the crucial question of subjective intent.
Nevertheless, a number of top First Amendment scholars,
including Kenneth Karst171 and Frederick Schauer,172 agreed
that a natural reading of Black does suggest that the true
threats category is limited to those threats spoken by
individuals who intend to threaten. Of course, as we shall
discuss, this does not answer an important subsequent
question—what kind of intent? Intent might mean that one’s
purpose was to threaten, but it might also mean that one is
merely aware that one’s statement may be threatening, even
though the words are spoken for another purpose (artistic
expression, release of anger, sending a political message . . .
etc.). Nonetheless, all of these nuances become irrelevant if we
are to reject the conclusion that the true threat exception
includes an intentionality requirement by the speaker, as did a
majority of Circuit Courts in Black’s wake.173
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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From the perspective of the harm principle discussed
earlier – the premise that categorical exclusions should be
justified by a compelling governmental interest to prevent
certain intolerable harms – we might conclude that intent
should be irrelevant. After all, whether intended or not, the
adverse impact of the threatening message on the listener
(whether it takes the form of pervasive fear and insecurity, or
coercion to take actions that one would otherwise not) will
presumably be unaffected. Larry Alexander has argued that it
is a mistake to focus on the intention of the speaker in free
speech analysis: “Once the First Amendment is triggered by
virtue of government’s regulatory intention, the analysis
should focus on the ultimate harm the government is seeking
to avert by interdicting the receipt of a message and the causal
mechanism through which receipt of the message leads to the
harm.”174
However, unless one sees the categorical approach as one
of pure dichotomy – either the expression lacks free speech
“value” (or imposes intolerable harm) or it does not – there
would appear to be some critical First Amendment interests at
stake in considering the intent of the speaker. While value and
harm focus on the speech itself and its impact, it is the speaker
himself who produces the expression. An intent-indifferent
definition of true threats would risk encouraging selfcensorship. Artists and polemicists whose works include
language that could be understood to be threatening – whether
it is rap music with aggressive lyrics or derisive social
commentary of a sardonic comedian – may be chilled. When
every word must be measured to avoid the risk of prosecution,
and when every irreverent utterance is a source of uncertainty
and insecurity, messages that would and should be protected
speech may be withheld from the public conversation out of
fear.
It is easy to forget that the Court’s traditional strict
every Circuit to have considered the issue —11 in total— has held that this
provision demands proof only of general intent, which here requires no more
than that a defendant knew he transmitted a communication, knew the
words used in that communication, and understood the ordinary meaning of
those words in the relevant context. Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 21, 25 (1995).
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scrutiny test involves not just a need for a compelling state
interest, but a narrow-tailoring requirement in which the
means of achieving that compelling interest must inhibit nomore speech than necessary to address the harm.175 A nuanced
doctrinal rule governing the true threats category might
distinguish among various possible sanctions that would apply
to true threats, some being more or less speech-inhibiting and
some more or less targeted at remedying the harm imposed.
The most urgent, and perhaps effective, method of mitigating
the distinctive harm caused by threatening speech may be to
simply return a sense of security to the threatened target by
way of a temporary restraining order. A higher level of intent
might be required to ratchet-up the sanctions imposed.
Without the requisite level of intent – wherever it is
determined to lie – the First Amendment might only permit
threatening speech to result in the imposition of a temporary
injunction or compensatory damages, but not criminal
penalties or punitive damages. These are, of course, just some
possibilities as to how a doctrinal test for true threats might be
structured. However, complete intent-indifference, because of
its speech chilling potential, might be said to fail the narrowtailoring requirement.
When the Court chooses to refine, in a principled manner,
a category itself and the doctrinal mechanisms that govern it –
as it did with defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan – the
Court shows appropriate sensitivity to the First Amendment
interests at stake. The Court acknowledges that identifying
the category is just the first step. The mere existence of an
excepted category is not an excuse for black or white
constitutional adjudication, nor for refusing to sort through
confusion and inconsistency at the Circuit Court level. Rather
than a blunt instrument that removes large swaths of speech
from protection without regard to the subtle distinctions within
that category, principled categorical tailoring responds to the
unique nature of the excepted category, minimizing the harm
to free expression while preserving the important
governmental tools essential to prevent intolerable harms. A
well-functioning categorical approach performs this function

175. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
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not on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, but according to a
preemptive tailoring of the category at issue. Consistency and
predictability is established by a robust body of precedent that
forms a clear set of rules for that category, and the Supreme
Court, due to its position at the top of the American judicial
hierarchy, is the one body with the capability to do this in a
uniform fashion.
The Choice of Categorical Non-Definition: Elonis v.
United States
Unfortunately, the Court’s courage in taking on the
nuanced doctrinal work of parsing an important categorical
free speech exception in Sullivan stands in stark contrast with
last year’s Elonis v. United States. The case was a highlyanticipated opportunity to, at last, put some meat on the bones
of the sparsely defined true threats category; it was also closely
watched by scholars and the mainstream press because it was
the Court’s “first examination of the limits of free speech on
social media.”176
At issue was a federal law making the interstate
transmission of “any communication containing any threat”
criminal.177 The law was applied to the lurid Facebook
postings of a self-described aspiring rap musician, directed at
his estranged wife and others.178 Lyrics posted “included
graphically violent language and imagery . . . often
interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were ‘fictitious,’
with no intentional ‘resemblance to real persons.’”179 Some
examples of the ominous messages include: “Fold up your
[protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket . . . Is it
thick enough to stop a bullet?[,]”180 “I’m not going to rest until
your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the
176. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Case Tests the Limits of Free Speech
on Facebook and Other Social Media, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-court-case-tests-thelimits-of-free-speech-on-facebook-and-other-socialmedia/2014/11/23/9e54dbd8-6f67-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html.
177. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2002.
178. Id. at 2004-06.
179. Id. at 2005.
180. Id. at 2006.
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little cuts[,]”181 and “[e]nough elementary schools in a ten mile
radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever
imagined [a]nd hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a
Kindergarten class.”182 The defendant described the postings
as “therapeutic”183 and argued that “[a]rt is about pushing
limits.”184 Elonis was nonetheless convicted.185 The Third
Circuit rejected the defendant’s contention that, under the
First Amendment, a speaker must intend to communicate a
threat.186 It instead agreed with the lower court that a mere
intent to express a message that would objectively be
understood as a threat would suffice – a reasonable person
test.187
The Supreme Court did not agree with the courts below.
However, it studiously avoided the First Amendment issue,
instead opting to decide the case on statutory grounds.188 And
even as a statutory decision, the Court strove to be as
parsimonious as possible, holding merely that, here, negligence
was not sufficient for criminal liability, but going no further.189
The statute was silent as to mental state, but the Court
reasoned that criminal culpability has traditionally been
understood to include some element of conscious wrongdoing.190
The prerequisite of a guilty mind would thus be read into the
law.
This, of course, tells us nothing about whether or not the
law would have been constitutional had the law explicitly
included negligent communications in its definition of criminal
threats. Nor does it tell us whether it would be constitutional
to penalize expression that is reckless as to whether or not the
communication will be interpreted as a threat. If recklessness
will not suffice, it also remains unclear whether the threat
needs to be purposeful or whether mere knowledge of its
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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threatening nature will satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.
Other unanswered questions about the true threats category
abound: Would the First Amendment calculus differ if this
were a mere civil action, rather than a criminal one? Is the
type of penalty imposed relevant to the constitutionality of
laws criminalizing a true threat? After decades of virtual
silence in this critical area, Elonis left us with no additional
insight into how “true threats” are to be treated as a “low
value” category of content based speech under the First
Amendment. According to the Court, it was simply “not
necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.”191 We are
left in the dark.
To Justice Alito – writing in partial dissent – the majority
was abdicating its duty. He lamented, “this case is certain to
cause confusion and serious problems . . . While this Court has
the luxury of choosing its docket, lower courts and juries are
not so fortunate. They must actually decide cases, and this
means applying a standard.”192 Justice Alito thus proceeds to
decide what the Court refused to decide. In doing so, he
unwittingly exposes just how doctrinally under-theorized and
woefully neglected the true threats category has been, and
remains.
In less than three pages, Justice Alito attempts to resolve
what is a remarkably consequential question of First
Amendment law: whether reckless expression of a threat
constitutes a constitutionally proscribable “true threat.”193 He
answers in the affirmative.194 Troublingly, he grounds his
analysis in the unresolved and muddled Chaplinsky reasoning
discussed above. Citing just three Supreme Court cases – none
of which, by the way, upheld a “true threat” conviction –
Justice Alito recounts the clearly “settled” rule that true
threats are not protected by the First Amendment.195 He
explains that “there are good reasons for that rule: True
threats inflict great harm and have little if any social value.”196
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 2012.
Id. at 2013-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Elonis, 135 S. Ct at 2014-16.
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However, just under the surface of what might seem like a
truism is a statement that begs the most vital questions and is
reflective of the still-pervasive confusion left behind in
Chaplinsky’s wake. A threat certainly may “inflict great harm”
and “have little if any social value,”197 but what if it imposes
some but not great harm? What if the threat does have social
value – such as a violent threat made against a high profile
politician intended to bring attention to, for example, that
politician’s indifference to the violence suffered by certain
segments of the population? One might object to the method of
getting the point across, but it would certainly constitute
political speech – traditionally considered to be among the
highest value expression.198
One interpretation then, of Justice Alito’s brief matter-offact assertion as to why true threats are not deserving of
protection, might be that he is putting forth a speech-protective
threshold definition for an unprotected “true” threat. In other
words, he could be suggesting that all other threats – those
that do not inflict great harm or have little if any social value –
are necessarily entitled to full First Amendment protection.
But if this is his thesis, do both the (great) harm attribute and
the low value attribute have to be present for a threat to be a
“true threat,” or will one or the other suffice? It is unclear. In
the alternative, these variables could be said to interact, such
that to be unprotected by the First Amendment a threat
imposing extreme harm has a lower threshold to meet when it
comes to an absence of social value, and vice versa.
Of course, a court cannot, and should not, be expected to
suss out all of these nuances in a single fact-specific case.
Perhaps Justice Alito did not intend his words to constitute a
definitional test at all. Perhaps he is suggesting that these
attributes are simply self-evident characteristics of threatening
speech. However, it does not take a lofty thought experiment
to conclude that not all threatening expression is created equal.
A friend’s threat to retract a dinner invitation may not be
hyperbole, and may even be mean-spirited, but it is unlikely to
be harmful enough to constitute unprotected speech. Not all
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346
(1995).
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threats “inflict,” or even risk inflicting, “great harm.”
A similar point might be made about the purported low
value of threats. Justice Alito attempts to wriggle out of the
“low value” difficulty by conceding: “It is true that a
communication containing a threat may include other
statements that have value and are entitled to protection. But
that does not justify constitutional protection for the threat
itself.”199 This, of course, is a straw man argument. The true
First Amendment conundrum is dealing not with the valuable
nature of other expression that might accompany a threat, but
with circumstances in which the threat itself has significant
social value. Even if we ultimately resolve that the harm
imposed justifies denying the threat to First Amendment
protection, courts should be upfront about the expressive costs
of doing so. If the Court is honest about the complexities
involved, and the stakes on all sides, it might incorporate these
variables into a distinctive “true threats” doctrinal rule, a rule
that can be applied consistently and predictably rather than on
an ad hoc basis.
We need only look to the Court’s defamation jurisprudence
to see that this goal is realistically attainable. Instead of
shying away from the inherent challenges of a categorical
system for content-based discrimination, with defamation, the
Court embraced the First Amendment puzzle and incorporated
significant nuance into its approach. It attached an array of
standards to the categorical non-protection of defamatory
speech, differentiating among expression directed at public
officials,200 public figures201 and private individuals,202 speech
containing intentional falsehoods, merely negligent ones203 or
falsehood where there is no fault at all,204 speech addressing
199. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016.
200. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
201. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
202. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974)
(concluding that “[s]tates should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to
enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of
a private individual”).
203. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
204. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (“[S]o long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to
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matters of public concern versus private matters,205 and
penalties that are punitive versus merely compensatory.206
Granted, it took time for the Court to flesh out these rules.
And of course, the job is never completely done. This is the
nature of a common law system in which courts are tasked
with resolving specific cases or controversies rather than
issuing broad policy prescriptions.
It took time for the
doctrinal rules governing this excepted category of speech to
take shape – and many would argue that the resolution was
not perfect. But the Court wisely appreciated its important
obligation to concretize this excepted First Amendment
category. This is quite a contrast with the true threats
category.
Reinvent the Wheel? Well . . . yes
One response might be to suggest a somewhat simple
solution. Rather than fretting about the Court’s unwillingness
to adequately operationalize particular categories of
unprotected speech, why not simply utilize one of the templates
already devised? With some categories – whether it be
commercial speech, obscenity, incitement, or defamation – the
Court has indeed articulated detailed definitional tests and
nuanced doctrinal rules for applying a categorical First
Amendment exclusion. One commentator, in one of the first
scholarly law review pieces to address the Elonis (non)decision,
suggests this very possibility.207
Michael Pierce, focusing specifically on the online context,
proposes a rule for the true threats category that would borrow
the public figure/private figure distinction from the Court’s
defamation jurisprudence.208 As with defamation, the requisite
a private individual.”).
205. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
761 (1985) (“In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving
no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately
supports awards of presumed and punitive damages – even absent a showing
of ‘actual malice.’”).
206. Id. at 763.
207. See Michael Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110
NW. U. L. REV. 51 (2015).
208. Id. at 59.
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level of intent for a particular threat to be unprotected would
depend upon who is targeted by the online threat.209 The
required mens rea for a non-protected true threat against a
public figure would be a higher (specific intent) than when the
threat is aimed at a private individual (recklessness).210 To
Pierce, the same rationale in the defamation context for this
two tiered intent standard would justify its use in the setting of
online threats.211 Namely, “the target’s identity can serve as a
useful proxy for whether the speech attacking him or her has
broader significance.”212
We
might
rightfully
applaud
the
author’s
acknowledgement that some threats are bound to have “value”
as speech, and that such value will vary from statement to
statement.213 Certainly, threatening language directed at
public figures may also communicate a message relating to an
issue of public concern. If the public figure is also a public
official with political duties, it may be even more likely that
punishing such threats will, in some sense, stifle public debate
and discussion about important issues. A heightened threshold
for intent was famously justified in New York Times v. Sullivan
as a critical speech protective measure because, as the Court
explained, “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate”
and it must thus be offered some First Amendment protection
if free expression is to have necessary “breathing space.”214
Because of the significant role they play in public life, this need
for breathing space becomes more important when criticisms
are directed at public figures. There is an unmistakable
tendency to discuss important public issues through the lens of
such individuals. One might reasonably agree that breathing
room for some falsehoods is analogous to breathing room for
some threatening language used against pubic figures. In
other words, the First Amendment protects the occasional
careless factual error about a public figure the same way it
should protect the occasional use of inflammatory rhetoric that
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
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might sound like a threat to an objective listener.
However, in other important respects, the public/private
figure distinction is not a good fit for the true threats category.
Public figure status of a target is a rather crude proxy for
threatening speech’s value. One might argue, as Pierce does,215
that the voluntary exposure to risk of defamation is quite
comparable to the voluntary exposure to threats one might
reasonably anticipate as a public figure. This may be true. A
threat against a public figure certainly may have significant
social value as expression, and it may, perhaps, be more likely,
on average, to have such value than threats made against
private individuals. But that does not make the analogy to
defamation a well-tailored fit for First Amendment purposes.
In sharp contrast with defamatory speech, there is no reason to
assume that there is a correlation in any particular case
between the target of a threat and that threat’s social value.
The Court famously concluded in R.A.V. v. St. Paul that
even within an unprotected category of speech, discriminatory
distinctions that prohibit some, but not all, speech are not
permissible unless they directly relate the very reason the
category is proscribable.216 This logic fits quite well with the
Court’s modified test for defamation of public figures; it makes
distinctions that relate directly to the reason why defamation is
an unprotected category in the first place.217 Public figures, by
definition, possess a reputation that is a matter of public
concern. Reputation is central to the life of a public figure in a
way that is qualitatively different than for a private individual.
The need to actively manage one’s reputation, the expectation
that one’s affairs will become a matter of public concern, and
the greater access to the media and other outlets that facilitate
effective use of counter speech to rebut falsehoods, are all part
and parcel of the public figure identity.
The doctrinal
distinction within the defamation category crafted by the Court
speaks directly to these qualities. As the Court explained in
215. See generally Pierce, supra note 207.
216. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1992).
WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam217. Defame,
MERRIAM
webster.com/dictionary/defame (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) (defining defame as
“to hurt the reputation of (someone or something) especially by saying things
that are false or unfair”).
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, public figures voluntarily “have assumed
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society . . . [and]
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved.”218 Public figures and private individuals are quite
simply not similarly situated with regard to the harm imposed
by the expressive category, nor to the speech value of the
expression.
In contrast, increased likelihood of being threatened is
merely associated with public figure status. This is not unlike
the way other qualities might make one more susceptible to
being a target of a threat such as wealth, power, a violent
temperament or a sharp tongue. Yet, there is little apparent
reason to believe that these attributes, like public figure status,
should result in a differential First Amendment standard for
determining whether someone else’s speech should be protected.
A threat imposes a fundamentally different kind of harm than
defamation. A threat is aimed directly at a target. Indeed, the
harm imposed by a threat is, by definition, only harmful when
the threatening idea reaches the consciousness of the target.
The words themselves place the target in a state of fear of an
impending concrete physical or psychological injury and may be
coercive. Defamation, in contrast, imposes a harm on the
target by disseminating false ideas into the greater
marketplace. Defamation wrongly diminishes or distorts the
perception others have of the target. The harmful ideas do not
need to reach the target for the injury to occur. If we take a
close look at the doctrinal standard established by the Court for
the defamation category, we see that it was thoughtfully
tailored to the nature of the particular harm imposed by
defamatory speech. True threats are in need of their own
similarly fine-tuned test and definition.
Conclusion
The goal of this article is not to propose a new model
framework for the doctrinal mechanics of the true threats
exception to the First Amendment. Ultimately it is up to the
218. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
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courts to establish this blueprint, to promote clarity, to further
First Amendment values while keeping in mind the
unfortunate truth that free speech cannot be absolute. This is
the Court’s job. With great doctrinal choice comes great
doctrinal responsibility. We have seen how the Court made one
such choice: the categorical model itself was one way of
addressing an intractable problem built into the First
Amendment. As with much Constitutional interpretation, the
process of refining and rationalizing a particular doctrinal
choice takes time. We have seen how the case that first laid
the groundwork for the categorical approach, Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, was riddled with ambiguity, leaving many
questions and uncertainties for the future. This article has
examined how many of these uncertainties stubbornly persist,
with members of the Court and top scholars alike still in
disagreement as to both how the categorical approach should
function and the basis on which particular categories should be
identified.
For the foreseeable future, the categorical approach is here
to stay. But a categorical system, without adequately defined
and systematized categories, is no system at all. It is arguably
much less protective than ad hoc balancing, for it establishes a
default rule that a particular category of speech is unprotected.
Without defining that category with precision, or establishing a
nuanced test that is tailored to the particular harms and
expressive interests unique to that speech category, the Court
invites blunt speech-suppressive legislation, uncertainty by
speakers whose expression might be chilled, and inconsistency
in the courts below. The First Amendment, as written, offers
no guidance as to how exceptions should be made to
comfortably coexist with its absolutist language. We have seen
how well the categorical model can work when adequately
fleshed out, as a fair and predicable doctrinal rule. There is
every reason to expect the Court to aspire for such clarity
wherever gaps in the categorical system exist.
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